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Abstract
This paper proposes a simple theory of international trade with
endogenous productivity di¤erences across countries. The core of our
analysis lies in the determinants of the division of labor. We consider
a world economy comprising two large countries, with a continuum of
goods and one factor of production, labor. Each good is characterized
by its complexity, dened as the number of tasks that must be per-
formed to produce one unit. There are increasing returns to scale in the
performance of each task, which creates gains from specialization, and
uncertainty in the enforcement of each contract, which create transac-
tion costs. The trade-o¤ between these two forces pins down the size of
productive teams across sectors in each country. Under free trade, the
country where teams are larger specializes in the more complex goods.
In our model, it is the country where the product of institutional qual-
ity and human per worker capital is larger. Hence, better institutions
and more educated workers are complementary sources of comparative
advantage in the more complex industries.
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1 Introduction
Ever since David Ricardo published his Principles of Political Econ-
omy, cross-country di¤erences in technology have featured prominently
in economistsexplanations of the international pattern of specialization
and trade. Yet, until quite recently, the formal trade-theory literature
has focused almost exclusively on the e¤ects of technological dispari-
ties without delving too much into their causes.This assessment of the
trade-theory literature by Grossman and Helpman (1995) appears as
relevant today as it was a decade ago. While our understanding of the
relationship between technological progress and trade has considerably
improved, we still know little about the determinants of productivity
di¤erences across countries and industries. The main objective of this
paper is to develop a simple theory of international trade that may also
shed light on the origins of these di¤erences.
The premise of our analysis is that the extent of the division of la-
bor is a key determinant of productivity, as rst emphasized by Smith
(1776).3 We enrich this fundamental insight by modeling formally the
channels through which the division of labor is itself determined. Our
analysis emphasizes two forces: (i) gains from specialization; and (ii)
transaction costs. As in Smiths pin factory, these gains derive from
increasing returns to scale in production. Their magnitude, however,
crucially depends on the complexity of the production process, which is
a function of an industrys technology. Transaction costs, on the other
hand, come from imperfect contract enforcement, as convincingly argued
by North (1990).4 In our model, they vary with institutional quality and
human capital per worker, which are characteristics of countries.
The basic logic of our trade theory can be sketched as follows. First,
the trade-o¤between gains from specialization and transaction costs pins
down the extent of the division of labor across sectors in each country.
Second, endogenous di¤erences in the optimal organization of production
determine the pattern of trade. Though simple, this two-step-approach
allows us to generate new predictions on the determinants of interna-
tional trade. By o¤ering a closer look at the origins of technological
di¤erences, we nd that better institutions and higher levels of educa-
3In the opening sentence of the Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith notes: The
greatest improvement in the productive powers of labour, and the greater part of the
skill, dexterity, and judgment with which it is any where directed, or applied, seem
to have been the e¤ects of the division of labour.
4One cannot take enforcement for granted. It is (and has always been) the critical
obstacle to increasing specialization and division of labor; North (1990).
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tion are complementary sources of comparative advantage in the more
complex industries.
Section 2 illustrates some of the main ideas of our analysis through a
simple example. Our formal model is described in section 3. We consider
a world economy comprising two large countries, with a continuum of
goods and workers.5 All workers are endowed with the same amount
of labor, which captures the level of education in a given country. The
production of every good requires that a set of elementary tasks be
performed. As previously mentioned, there are increasing returns to
scale in the performance of each task: before being able to perform a
task, workers must spend a xed amount of time learning it. Goods
di¤er in their complexity, dened as the number of elementary tasks
that must be performed to produce one unit. The more complex a good
is, the longer it takes to learn how to perform all tasks, and the larger
are the gains from the division of labor.
In each industry, contracts organize productive activities by assigning
elementary tasks to workers. But, their enforcement is imperfect. If the
contract of a worker is enforced, she performs her tasks in accordance
with the terms of her contract; otherwise, she does not perform at all. A
key parameter of the model is the probability with which a given contract
is enforced. This probability is assumed identical across industries and
aims to capture institutional quality, that is the e¢ ciency of the judicial
system and/or the level of trust in a given country.
Section 4 characterizes the e¢ cient organization of production. Our
analysis of the extent of the division of labor builds on previous works
by Becker and Murphy (1992) and Kremer (1993). It predicts that team
size formally, the number of workers who cooperate on each unit of
a given good increases with institutional quality and complexity, but
decreases with human capital per worker.
Section 5 analyzes the pattern of trade between two countries which
share the same technological know-how, but di¤er in the quality of their
institutions and the human capital of their workers. Because there are
increasing returns to scale in the performance of each task, the coun-
try with larger teams in e¢ ciency units of labor specializes in the
more complex goods under free trade. In our model, it is the country
where the product of institutional quality and workershuman capital is
5For expositional purposes, we always refer to economic agents as workers, but
they may be independent contractorsas well. Our model is agnostic about whether
the division of labor takes place within or outside the boundary of the rm.
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larger. Hence, better institutions and higher levels of human capital are
complementary sources of comparative advantage in the more complex
industries.
Section 6 uses this qualitative insight to identify in the data which
countries have according to our theory better institutions. Our em-
pirical strategy is simple. First, we identify which countries have a com-
parative advantage in the more complex industries. Second, we estimate
the pattern of comparative advantage predicted by the cross-country
variation in human capital. Finally, we infer countries institutional
quality from the di¤erence between their actual and their predicted pat-
tern of exports.
Our paper makes two distinct contributions to the existing trade
literature. First, it contributes to the recent, but rapidly growing, liter-
ature on international trade and institutions; see e.g. Acemoglu et al.
(2006), Cunat and Melitz (2006), Levchenko (2004), Matsuyama (2004),
Nunn (2005), and Vogel (2004). The starting point of these papers is
the same as ours. While a given institutional characteristic may a¤ect
productivity in all sectors, it presumably a¤ects it relatively more in
some sectors, hence the pattern of comparative advantage. Our paper
di¤ers signicantly, though, in terms of the specic mechanism through
which institutions a¤ect productivity, and in turn, international trade.
Our model introduces complexity as the main source of institutional
dependence across industries. The logic inspired by Smith (1776)
and Norths (1990) fundamental insights is simple and intuitive: larger
gains from specialization imply more workers per team, and so more con-
tracts to be enforced. Building on this idea, we are able to generate new
predictions on the pattern of international trade, which we use to mea-
sure institutional quality. Unlike previous papers, we do not try to test a
particular trade theory by using existing proxies of institutional quality.
Instead, we let trade data tell us which countries have according to our
theory better institutions.
Focusing on the endogenous organization of production presents an-
other advantage. It allows us to develop a single trade model where
both institutions and education interact to determine the pattern of
trade. Hence, our paper also contributes to the recent literature on
international trade and human capital; see e.g. Grossman and Maggi
(2000), Grossman (2004), and Ohnsorge and Treer (2004). The previ-
ous papers show that not only aggregate factor endowments, but also the
dispersion of these factors across workers can be a source of comparative
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advantage. Our theory shows that when there are gains from specializa-
tion and transaction costs, factor endowments per worker also matter
for the pattern of trade. By going beyond the black-boxof aggregate
production functions, our model is able to shed light on another channel
through which individual di¤erences in human capital may a¤ect trade
ows across countries.6
2 A Simple Example
Some of the main ideas of our analysis are best illustrated by a simple
example. Consider an island economy with two sectors: pins and com-
puters. The island is populated by many identical workers, each able
to work for 300 days. In each industry, producing one unit of output
requires many complementary tasks to be performed; and whatever the
task is, it takes a worker 1 day to learn it and 1 more day to perform
it.7 But, computers are more complex than pins: it takes 10 tasks to
produce a pin, against 100 to produce a computer.
In both industries, goods can be produced by teams of 1 or 2 workers.
For each worker, there is a contract that stipulates her assignment of
tasks. However, such contracts are not perfectly enforced. Only 90%
of the workers fulll their contractual obligations; the remaining 10%
do not perform any tasks. Given the technological and institutional
constraints of the island, what is the e¢ cient team size in the pin and
computer industries, respectively?
Consider rst the pin industry. If there is 1 worker per team, then
this worker needs 10 training days to learn how to produce a pin from
the beginning to the end. Instead, if there are 2 workers per team, then
each worker may specialize in only 5 tasks, and spend 5 more days pro-
ducing rather than learning. The 5 days that are saved for production
by adding an extra worker captures the gains from specialization. What
are the associated transaction costs? While a team with a single worker
has a 90% chance to produce, a team with 2 specialized workers needs
both of them to perform, and so produces with probability 81%. Special-
ization increases the number of contracts that need to be simultaneously
enforced, which reduces the expected output of each team. In the pin
industry, this second e¤ect is dominant. If teams are of size 1, each
worker may produce for 300   10 = 290 days, with probability 90%. If
teams are of size 2, each worker may produce for 300   5 = 295 days,
6Our analysis is also related, though less closely, to Antras et al. (2006) who
investigate the relationship between the distribution of human capital and o¤shoring.
7In other words, it takes 3 days for a given worker to perform the same task twice.
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but with probability 81%. Since 0:9 290 = 261 > 0:81 295 = 238:95,
the e¢ cient team size in the pin industry is equal to 1.
Let us now turn to the computer industry. If there are 2 workers per
team, then each worker may save 50 training days. While there are gains
from specialization in both industries, these gains are 10 times larger in
the computer industry. Thus for given transaction costs, its teams ought
to be larger. Indeed, in a team of size 1, each worker may produce for
300   100 = 200 days, with probability 90%; in a team of size 2, each
worker may produce for 300   50 = 250 days, with probability 81%.
Since 0:9  200 = 180 < 0:81  250 = 202:5, the e¢ cient team size in
the computer industry is equal to 2.
This, in a nutshell, explains why the division of labor should be
more extensive in the more complex industries. What does this example
tell us about di¤erences in team size across countries? Two things: (i)
countries with worse institutions should have smaller teams; and (ii)
countries with higher levels of education should have smaller teams. To
see this, suppose that institutional quality in the island goes down. A
given contract now is enforced with a 50% chance. In this case, gains
from specialization are unchanged, but transaction costs go up, and so
team size decreases. Since 0:5  200 = 100 > 0:25  250 = 62:5, the
e¢ cient team size in the computer industry goes down from 2 to 1.
Similarly, suppose that human capital per worker goes up. The same 300
working days now are worth 600 days. Then, team size also decreases
from 2 to 1 in the computer industry, since 0:9500 = 450 > 0:81550 =
445:5. Again, gains from specialization are unchanged, but transaction
costs go up there is more to lose when contracts are not enforced and
so team size decreases.
Suppose now that the island opens up to trade. Its trading partner
shares the same technology, but di¤ers in the quality of its institutions
and the levels of human capital of its workers. Which of the two islands,
if any, should specialize in the computer industry? Our answer is simple:
it is the island where teams are larger in e¢ ciency units under autarky,
i.e. the island where the number of working days per team is larger.
In the rst island, we know that teams in the pin industry comprise 1
worker, endowed with 300 working days. Hence, there are 300 e¢ ciency
units per team in this sector. Similarly, teams in the computer industry
comprise 2 workers, and so 2300 = 600 e¢ ciency units. Let us assume
that in the second island, there are 300 e¢ ciency units per team in both
industries. This may correspond to one of these two cases: (i) workers in
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the second island are endowed with the same amount of human capital,
but worse institutions have lead to teams of size 1 in both sectors; or (ii)
workersendowments in the second island only are half what they are in
the rst island, but better institutions have lead to teams of size 2. In
any case, the rst island has a comparative advantage in the computer
industry.
To see this, let us dene a1p and a
1
c as the average number of days
necessary to produce one pin and one computer in the rst island. Since
there is 1 worker per team in the pin industry, we have: a1p =
300
2900:9
10
=
11:5. In the computer industry, there are 2 workers per team and so:
a1c =
600
5000:81
100
= 148. In turn, the relative unit labor requirement is given
by: a
1
c
a1p
= 12:8. Now, let us dene a2p and a
2
c as the average number of
days necessary to produce one pin and one computer in the second island.
Similar computation leads to: a
2
c
a2p
= 14:5 > 12:8 = a
1
c
a1p
. The pattern of
trade follows. In the island where teams are larger in e¢ ciency units,
xed learning costs can be spread over larger amounts of output. As a
result, this island produces and exports computers, which are associated
with larger learning costs.
This simple example illustrates two ideas: (i) di¤erences in institu-
tions and human capital per worker lead to di¤erences in the optimal
organization of production across countries; and (ii) these endogenous
di¤erences confer distinct comparative advantages. In particular, the
country with larger teams in e¢ ciency units has a comparative advan-
tage in the more complex goods. This is valuable information, but by no
means the end of the story. One fundamental question remains: what is
the country with larger teams in e¢ ciency units? The previous example
only suggests that it might be the country with better institutions or
lower levels of human capital, because it has more workers per team; or
on the contrary, the country with higher levels of human capital, because
workers have larger endowments in e¢ ciency units. In order to give a
satisfactory answer to this question, we need a formal model to which
we now turn.
3 The Model
We consider a world economy comprising two countries, indexed by c =
1; 2, and a continuum of industries, indexed by i 2 [0; 1].
Endowments. Each country is populated by continuum of workers
indexed by n 2 [0; Lc]. Workers are perfectly mobile across industries
and immobile across countries. There are no other factors of production.
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All workers in country c are endowed with hc e¢ ciency units of labor,
to which we refer as human capital per worker.
Demand. Following Dornbusch et al. (1977), we assume that workers
in the two countries aim to maximize the same Cobb-Douglas utility
function. Hence, the world demand Di for good i 2 [0; 1] is given by
piDi = bi (w1L1 + w2L2) , (1)
where pi > 0 is the price of good i; bi > 0 is the constant expenditure
share on good i with
R 1
0
bi di = 1; and w1 and w2 are the wages per
worker in country 1 and 2, respectively.
Technology (I): Complementarity. In each industry, a continuum of
complementary tasks t 2 [0; zi] must be performed in order to produce
one unit of good i. We refer to the number of tasks zi > 0 as the
complexity of good i. This is an exogenous characteristic of an industry:
the more complex good i is, the more elementary tasks are required in its
production. For expositional purposes, we assume that zi is continuous
and strictly increasing in i. Formally, the output of good i is given by
Qi =
Z +1
0
min
t2[0;zi]

qi (t; u)

du (2)
where qi (t; u) is equal to 1 if task t is performed on the u-th unit of good
i, and zero otherwise. According to Equation (2), all tasks are essential:
if any task t is not performed on unit u, then this unit is not produced.8
In addition, task performance is unit-specic: a task which is supposed
to be performed on unit u cannot be used on unit u0 6= u.
Technology (II): Increasing Returns. There are increasing returns
to scale in the performance of each task. The amount of labor li(n; t)
required by a worker n performing task t at least once in industry i is
given by
li(n; t) =
Z +1
0
qi (n; t; u) du+ f (t) (3)
8More generally, we could assume that
Qi =
Z +1
0
"Z zi
0
qi (t; u)
i 1
i dt
# i
i 1
du,
with i < 1. Under this weaker assumption, it is easy to check that all tasks remain
essential, which is is su¢ cient to derive Equation (8) and all subsequent results.
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where qi (n; t; u) is equal to 1 if worker n performs task t on the u-th
unit of good i, and zero otherwise. We interpret the xed overhead cost
f(t) > 0 as the time necessary to learn how to perform task t. In the
rest of this paper, we assume that f(t) is identical across tasks, and
normalize it to 1. Hence, the total training costs in industry i are equal
to
R zi
0
f(t)dt = zi. The more complex a good is, the longer it takes to
learn how to produce it, and the larger are the gains from the division
of labor.9
FirmsOrganization. In each country and industry, there are a large
number of price-taking rms. Firms can organize their production by
designing a set of jobs, J , and writing contracts, C, that assign workers
to these jobs for each unit they want to produce. Formally, rms have
2 control variables:
1. A partition J  fJ1; :::; JNg of the set of tasks [0; zi];
2. A function C (n; u) : [0; Lc] R+ ! fJ; ;g.
We assume that once hired by a rm, workers get paid wc irrespective
of the number of tasks they perform.10 We also assume that rms cannot
assign more than 1 worker to the same job on any given unit. Hence, the
number of distinct jobs N measures the extent of the division of labor,
namely the number of workers who participate in the production of each
unit. In the reminder of this paper, we refer to N as team size. This is
the key endogenous variable in our model.
Institutions. We focus on a single, but crucial, function of institutions:
contract enforcement. Our starting point is that better institutions
either formal or informal increase the probability that contracts are
enforced. If c  0 is the quality of institutions in country c, then for
any task t 2 [0; zi], any unit u 2 R+, and any worker n 2 [0; Lc] such
that t 2 C (n; u), we assume that(
qi(n; t; u) = 1; with probability e 
1
c ;
qi(n; t; u) = 0; with probability 1  e  1c . (4)
9Strictly speaking, complexity measures the number of tasks necessary to produce
one unit of output. All tasks are identical, but more complex goods require more
tasks. Alternatively, one could assume that all goods require the same number of
tasks, but that some tasks take more time to be learnt than others. Then, more
complex goods would be the ones associated with more complicated tasks. It should
be clear that these two approaches are equivalent; in any case, total training costs
solely determine the magnitude of the gains from specialization.
10Formally, a worker n is hired by a rm if there exists u 2 R+ s.t. C (n; u) 6= ;.
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When c = 0, institutions are completely ine¢ cient and workers never
perform any task. When  = 1, institutions are perfect, and as in the
neoclassical benchmark, workers perform the tasks stipulated in their
contracts with probability 1.
For simplicity, we assume that the contract of a given worker n is
either enforced on all tasks and all units or not enforced at all. If a
worker shirks on one assignment of tasks, she shirks on all of them.11 We
also abstract from any interaction across workers. Each worker randomly
performs her assignment of tasks with probability e 
1
c , irrespective of
the performance of other workers. In our model, imperfect contract
enforcement is treated as an additional technological constraint: c is an
exogenous parameter, not a control variable.12
4 The Organization of Production
In this section, we focus on the supply-side of the economy. Demand
and market clearing conditions will be introduced in Section 5.
4.1 Prot Maximization
In each country and industry, rms choose their organization (J; C) in or-
der to maximize their expected prots taking prices and wages as given.
Denoting L the number of workers hired by a rm with organization
(J; C), the rmsmaximization program can be expressed as
max
J;C
piE
 
Qi
  wcL. (P)
Complexity, human capital per worker, and the quality of institutions
determine expected output, E(Qi), as a function of rmsorganizations.
Combining Equations (2) and (4), expected output can be written as
E
 
Qi

= Q
i
c  e 
N
c . (5)
The rst term Q
i
c represents the number of potential units, i.e. the
units that can be produced were all contractual obligations fullled. It
depends on the complexity of good i and the level of human capital in
country c, as we will soon demonstrate. The second term e 
N
c represents
11This is reminiscent of repeated games à la Bernheim and Whinston (1990). In a
model where enforcement depends on rmstrigger strategies, rms punish as much
as possible, and in turn, workers shirk as much as possible.
12There is, however, a fundamental di¤erence between the notions of Technology
and Institutionson which our trade model builds. While the same technological
know-how may be available in di¤erent countries a rm may simply set up a new
plant abroad institutions are intrinsically country-specic.
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the probability that each potential unit gets actually produced. When
team size is equal to N , production requires N contracts to be simulta-
neously enforced. If each contract is randomly enforced with probability
e 
1
c , this only occurs with probability e 
N
c . The decrease from e 
1
c to
e 
N
c reects the transaction costs associated with the division of labor
in our model.
Note that the existence of transaction costs relies on 2 crucial fea-
tures of the production function: (i) all tasks are essential; and (ii) all
tasks are unit-specic. If all tasks were perfect substitutes13 or if rms
could freely combine jobs performed on di¤erent units, expected output
would depend on e 
1
c the probability that a given worker performs
her job rather than e 
N
c the probability that a given team performs.
Therefore, there would be no costs associated with the division of labor
and all workers would specialize in 1 elementary task. We view the func-
tional form imposed in Equation (2) as a convenient way to depart from
this extreme prediction.
4.2 Optimal Organization
We start by describing some general restrictions that prot maximization
imposes on rmsorganization. We will then use these restrictions to
compute the optimal team size in each country and industry.
Lemma 1 Under prot maximization, rmsorganization is such that:
(i) contracts never assign a worker to more than 1 job, and (ii) all jobs
include the same number of tasks.
The formal proof can be found in Appendix A. The intuition behind
Claim (i) is simple. For any given team size, prot maximization requires
the number of potential units to be maximized, which is achieved by
minimizing training costs per worker. Hence, workers who know how to
perform 1 job should perform it as many times as possible. The logic
behind Claim (ii) is more subtle. A marginal decrease in the number of
tasks z included in a job increases the number of potential units, hc z
z
,
that workers specializing in that job can participate in. However, this
increase is larger for jobs with more tasks: hc z
z
is convex in z. Since
prot maximization requires marginal changes in workersproductivity
to be equalized across jobs, it also requires each job to include the same
number of tasks.
13If there exist 2 groups of tasks, those that are perfect substitutes and those that
are perfect complements, then our results are unchanged. One just need to bundle
tasks that are perfect substitutes together into one essential task, then all tasks are
perfect complements.
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Now consider a prot-maximizing rm in country c and industry i
with L workers organized in teams of size N . By Lemma 1, each worker
specializes in 1 job and each job includes z
i
N
tasks. Thus, each worker
has hc  ziN units of labor available for production. At the rm level, that
is a total of L  hc   ziN  units of labor to be allocated across zi tasks.
As a result, the maximum number of potential units Q
i
c(L;N) that this
rm can produce is equal to
Q
i
c(N;L) = L

hc
zi
  1
N

. (6)
According to Equation (6), Q
i
c(N;L) is increasing in N . As team size
increases, workers become more specialized training costs per worker
decrease and the number of potential units goes up.14
We are ready to compute the optimal team size N ic in country c and
industry i. Using Equations (5) and (6), we can rearrange (P ) as
max
N;L
L

pie 
N
c

hc
zi
  1
N

  wc

.
Hence, N ic is implicitly given by the following rst-order condition
zi
(N ic)
2 =
1
c

hc   z
i
N ic

. (7)
MB  zi
N2
corresponds to the marginal benet of increasing team size.
It is equal to the extra units of labor that workers are able to spend
performing tasks, rather than learning them. MC  1
c

hc   ziN

corre-
sponds the marginal cost of increasing team size. It is equal to the extra
units of labor that are lost when contracts are not enforced. Equation
(7) states that when team size is chosen optimally, the marginal gains
from the division of labor are equal to the transaction costs they create.
This is described graphically in Figure 1.
We can solve Equation (7) explicitly. In our model, N ic is uniquely
determined as a function of complexity, zi, institutional quality, c, and
human capital per worker, hc:
N ic =
zi
2hc
 
1 +
r
1 +
4chc
zi
!
. (8)
14In particular, Q
i
c(N;L) is.maximized when N is innite and every worker only
learns an innitesimal task. If tasks always are performed, e¢ ciency requires each
skill to be used as intensively as possible. This is in the spirit of Rosen (1983).
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NMC
MB
zi/hc Nic
Figure 1: Optimal Team Size
We conclude by noting thatN ic does not depend on L. This means that
once jobs and contracts are set optimally there are constant returns to
scale at the rm level: the expected output of a rm doubles when it
doubles its employment. As a result, the number of workers L hired
by a rm is: indeterminate if the real wage, wc=pi, is equal to expected
output per worker, e 
Nic
c 

hc
zi
  1
N ic

; equal to 0 if it is strictly higher;
and equal to +1 if it is strictly lower.
4.3 Comparative Statics
We can use Equation (8) to undertake comparative static analysis. The
main predictions of our theory on the determinants of team size, i.e. the
extent of the division of labor, are summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 The extent of the division of labor: (i) increases with
institutional quality; (ii) increases with complexity; and (iii) decreases
with human capital per worker.
As previously mentioned, N ic depends on the trade-o¤ between gains
from specialization and transaction costs. In Figure 1, the MB curve
captures the marginal gains of increasing team size, and the MC curve
its marginal costs. When institutional quality improves, transaction
costs decrease at the marginMC shifts down and team size increases.
Similarly, as the complexity of an industry increases, marginal gains from
specialization increaseMB shifts up and transaction costs decrease
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at the marginMC shifts down,15 which both increase team size. Since
N ic only depends on z
i and hc through their ratio, an increase in workers
human capital is equivalent to a decrease in the goods complexity. As
a result, team size decreases with human capital per worker.
5 Free Trade Equilibrium
5.1 Denition
Before dening a free trade equilibrium for our economy, we make a few
simple observations. First, since there are constant returns to scale at the
rm level, we can describe the production possibility frontiers of the two
countries as in Dornbusch et al. (1977). In our set-up once jobs and
contracts have been set optimally the constant unit labor requirement,
aic, in country c and industry i is given by
aic =

e 
Nic
c 

hc
zi
  1
N ic
 1
, (9)
where N ic is given by Equation (8). Second, the equality of supply and
demand for all goods i 2 [0; 1] requires zero prots under constant re-
turns to scale. This implies
pi=wc  aic, (10)
with strict equality if good i is produced in country c. Condition (10)
simultaneously pins down the price of good i and the country where it
is produced as a function of the wages w1 and w2 in the two countries.
Third, the equilibrium of the labor market in country c requiresZ
i2Sc
bi (w1L1 + w2L2) di = wcLc, (11)
where Sc  [0; 1] is the set of goods produced and exported by country
c.16 This last equation pins down the relative wage !  w1
w2
, as a function
of the pattern of international specialization.
Based on the previous discussion, we dene a free trade equilibrium
in our economy as follows.
15More complex goods are associated with larger training costs. So, when com-
plexity increases, the number of potential units decreases, and the loss of expected
output associated with a marginal increase in team size decreases as well.
16For expositional purposes, we ignore situations where the same good is simulta-
neously produced in country 1 and country 2. In a free trade equilibrium, the set of
goods for which this may occur will be of measure zero.
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Denition 1 A free trade equilibrium is a continuum of prices pi for
all i 2 [0; 1]; a pair of wages w1 and w2; a pattern of international
specialization described by S1 and S2; a continuum of team sizes N ic for
all i 2 [0; 1] and c = 1; 2, such that: (i) rms maximize their expected
prots, Equation (8); (ii) rms make zero prots, Condition (10); and
(iii) labor markets clear in every country, Equation (11).
5.2 The Origins of Comparative Advantage
The pattern of comparative advantage in our model is determined
like in any other Ricardian model by di¤erences in labor productivity
across countries and industries. The contribution of our paper is to o¤er
a trade theory that also is able to explain where these di¤erences come
from, namely the origins of comparative advantage.
The Main Result. Let us denote A (zi; 1; h1; 2; h2)  a
i
2
ai1
the relative
unit labor requirement function which is at the heart of the standard
Ricardian model. Equation (9) implies
A
 
zi; 1; h1; 2; h2

=
h2N
i
2e
Ni2
2 (h1N
i
1   zi)
h1N i1e
Ni1
1 (h2N i2   zi)
, (12)
Equation (12) allows us to analyze how institutions and human capital
per worker endogenously determine the pattern of comparative advan-
tage. The main result of our paper is presented in Proposition 2. As
before, the formal proof can be found in Appendix A.
Proposition 2 A is strictly increasing in zi if and only if 1h1 > 2h2.
Proposition 2 states that the country where the product of institu-
tional quality and human capital per worker is higher has a comparative
advantage in the more complex industries. The logic is the following.
An increase in complexity zi a¤ects the unit labor requirement aic in two
ways. First, it directly increases the average labor cost of a potential
unit, AC = z
ihcN ic
hcN ic zi ; second, it increases team size. When team size is
optimal, the latter, however, is a second-order e¤ect. This means that
the increase in aic only depends on the increase in AC, and in turn, on the
teamsworkforce measured in e¢ ciency units, hcN ic. If hcN
i
c is larger,
then workersoutput on each task is larger as well. As a result, increas-
ing the magnitude of xed training costs lowers their output relatively
less, which raises AC relatively less. This implies that the increase in
unit labor requirements is relatively smaller in the country with larger
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teams in e¢ ciency units. By Equation (8), we know that this is the
country where the product of institutional quality and human capital
per worker is larger.
Comments. Although both institutional quality and human capital per
worker are independent sources of comparative advantage, they deter-
mine the pattern of comparative advantage in two very di¤erent ways.
Institutional quality c only has an indirect e¤ect on the pattern of com-
parative advantage, through its impact on the optimal team size N ic. If
team size was exogenously given, then di¤erences in institutions across
countries would have no e¤ect on the pattern of trade. Formally, the
monotonicity of A(zi; 1; h1; 2; h2) would be independent of 1 and 2;
see Equation (12). In our model, it is the endogenous division of labor
that makes institutions a source of comparative advantage.
By contrast, human capital per worker hc has both a direct and an
indirect e¤ect on the pattern of comparative advantage. Besides its im-
pact on N ic, it mechanically increases the teamsworkforce in e¢ ciency
units. Thus, even if N ic was exogenously given, cross-country di¤erences
in human capital would still a¤ect the pattern of comparative advantage.
When workers are more educated, they spend a smaller fraction of their
time learning, and so unit labor requirements are lower; see Equation
(9). Furthermore, this decrease is not uniform across goods. In the more
complex sectors, learning costs are more important and the decrease in
unit labor requirements is larger. As a result, the country with more
educated workers is relatively more e¢ cient in the more complex indus-
tries. Does the endogeneity of the division of labor a¤ect this pattern?
The answer is no. When the extent of the division of labor is endoge-
nous, higher levels of human capital also decrease N ic, but Equation (8)
guarantees that this indirect e¤ect is always dominated by the direct
e¤ect: hcN ic increases with hc.
Compared to the standard Ricardian model, an increase in work-
erslabor endowments is not equivalent to an increase in country size,
Lc. In our model, higher values of hc confer comparative advantage
in the more complex sectors. Even if they share the same technology
and institutions, a country with one billion workers and a country with
one hundred million workers, each of them ten times more productive,
are economically distinct trading partners, with distinct comparative
advantage. By focusing on individual rather than aggregate levels of
human capital, our theory generates a new channel distinct from the
Heckscher-Ohlin model through which cross-country di¤erences in ed-
ucation levels may a¤ect the pattern of trade.
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At this point, it is worth emphasizing a key di¤erence between our
approach and Grossman and Maggi (2000), Grossman (2004), and Ohn-
sorge and Treer (2004). In our economy, workers from the same country
are all identical. Human capital per worker only acts as a determinant of
labor productivity. By contrast, worker heterogeneity is at the heart of
the aforementioned papers. They assume that technologies are identical
across countries, but allow endowments of human capital to di¤er across
workers. In their model, it is the sorting of di¤erent workers into dif-
ferent industries, which makes the distribution of human capital across
workers a source of comparative advantage.
Finally, note that Proposition 2 predicts that institutional quality
and human capital per worker have complementary e¤ects on the pat-
tern of comparative advantage. Since c and hc a¤ect A through their
product, improvements in institutions have larger e¤ects in countries
with more educated workers. Similarly, improvements in education have
larger e¤ects in countries with better institutions.
5.3 The Pattern and Consequences of Trade
Having established how the pattern of comparative advantage is endoge-
nously determined in our economy, we can characterize the free trade
equilibrium as in Dornbusch et al. (1977). Without loss of generality,
we assume that country 1 has a comparative advantage in the more
complex industries:
1h1 > 2h2.
So, A is strictly increasing in zi by Proposition 2.
International Specialization. The monotonicity of A allows us to
characterize the pattern of international specialization in a straightfor-
ward manner. Irrespective of the relative wage !  w1
w2
in equilibrium,
there must be a complexity level ez > 0 such that
! = A(ez). (13)
By construction, A(zi) < ! if and only if zi < ez. Condition (10) therefore
implies that in a free trade equilibrium:
S1 = fi 2 [0; 1] j z > ezg ;
S2 = fi 2 [0; 1] j z < ezg .
Condition (10) also implies that the equilibrium prices of goods in S1
and S2 are given by w1ai1 and w2a
i
2, respectively.
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Figure 2: The Pattern of Trade
Labor Market Equilibrium. By Walras law, we can focus on the
labor market in country 2. Rearranging Equation (11), we get
! =
L2
L1


1  #(ez)
#(ez)

 B(ez), (14)
where #(ez)  Z
i2S2
bi di is the share of income spent on goods from
country 2. Since zi is continuous and strictly increasing in i, B is strictly
decreasing in ez. Intuitively, an increase in the range of goods produced
in country 2 raises, at constant wages, the demand for labor in country
2. Thus a rise in w2 i.e. a decrease in ! is required to maintain the
equality between demand and the existing labor supply, L2.
Predictions. Equations (13) and (14) jointly determine the relative
wage, !, and the cut-o¤, ez; see Figure 2. This completes our analysis of
a free trade equilibrium. Our ndings are summarized in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 In a free trade equilibrium, country 1 produces and ex-
ports the more complex goods; country 2 produces and exports the less
complex ones.
The welfare impact of trade is straightforward. Compared to autarky,
the real wage w1
pi
is identical for goods whose production remains in
country 1 in a free trade equilibrium. However, it goes up for goods
whose production shifts to country 2. (Otherwise, they would still be
produced in country 1.) The same reasoning applies to the real wage w2
pi
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in country 2. Thus, both countries gain from trade.17 The pattern of
specialization between developed and developing countries also is clear.
Countries with worse institutions and less educated workers specialize
in the less complex goods.
We can also analyze the impact of trade on team size by combining
Propositions 1 and 3. The prediction again is unambiguous: interna-
tional trade decreases average team size in developing countries, while
increasing it in developed countries. In our model, trade does not change
how goods are produced in each country. Technological and institutional
constraints fully characterize the team size that maximize expected prof-
its; see Equation (8). But by changing which goods are produced, trade
a¤ects the overall distribution of team size in the two countries. Under
free trade , country 1 specializes in industries where teams are larger and
country 2 in those where they are smaller. As a result, average team size
increases in the former country and decreases in the latter.
6 Application: Measuring Institutional Quality
The main qualitative insight of our theory can be summarized as follows.
Countries with better institutions and/or more human capital per worker
will produce and export relatively more in the more complex industries.
In this section, we use this insight to identify in the data which coun-
tries have according to our theory better institutions. Our empirical
strategy is simple. First, we identify which countries export relatively
more in the more complex industries. Second, we ask how much of the
previous cross-country variation is predicted by observable di¤erences
in human capital per worker. Whatever is left unexplained, we then
interpret as a revealed measure of institutional quality.
6.1 Data
To implement our empirical strategy, we need data on complexity, human
capital per worker, and exports.
Complexity. In our model, complexity, zi, measures the magnitude of
xed training costs in industry i. To estimate these costs, we use the
PSID surveys of 1985 and 1993 which ask workers of di¤erent industries:
Suppose someone had the experience and education needed to start
17In a previous version of the paper, we also consider the impact of changes in
institutional quality and human capital per worker in the two countries. Our results
echo the analysis of technological progress in Krugman (1986). When improvements
in institutions and education occur in the developed country, both countries gain.
But when they occur in the developing country, the developed country might be
harmed.
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working at a job like yours. From that point, how long would it take
them to become fully trained and qualied (to do a job like yours)?
Our proxy for complexity is equal to the average number of months
necessary to be fully trained and qualied in industry i.18 It ranges from
2.38 months knitting mills to 35.19 months optical and health
services supplies; see Table B1.
Human Capital per Worker. In order to measure human capital per
worker in country c, hc, we use the estimates of Hall and Jones (1999),
which are based on the average educational attainment in 1985 reported
in Barro and Lee (2000). Country characteristics for all exporters in the
sample are given in Table B2.
Exports. We use exports data from the 1992 World Trade Flows Data-
base; see Feenstra et al. (2005). Our nal sample includes 20 industries,
which together account for 57% of world exports in manufacturing; see
Appendix for details. In order to limit the prevalence of zero imports
a standard issue in the gravity literature; see e.g. Hanson and Xiang
(2004) we limit our sample to the 21 largest exporting countries and
the 34 largest importing countries. Together, these countries account
for 90% of world exports and imports in the sample, respectively. Af-
ter dropping all observations that contain zero trade values (25% of all
observations), we end up with a total of 10,756 observations.
6.2 Comparative Advantage: Pins or Computers?
In order to identify the pattern of comparative advantage across coun-
tries and industries, we follow Costinot and Komunjer (2006) and con-
sider the following linear regression19
lnxicd = cd + 
i
d + cz
i + "icd, (15)
where xicd are the exports from country c to a destination d in industry i;
cd is an exporter-importer xed e¤ect which aims to capture the impact
of wages in country c as well as trade barriers between countries c and d
(e.g. physical distance, existence of colonial ties, use of a common lan-
guage, or participation in a monetary union); id is an importer-industry
18In our model, the average training costs per worker zNz is an increasing function
of the total training costs z; see equation (8). Hence, the average number of months
necessary to be fully trained and qualied in a given sector is a valid proxy for
complexity (in spite of the obvious fact that this number also depends on the extent
of the division of labor).
19Costinot (2005) shows how the model developed in Section 3 can be generalized
to lead to Equation (15). The key ingredient of the generalized model is the existence
of random productivity shocks à la Eaton and Kortum (2002) within each industry.
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Country Ranking
Japan 1
United States 2
Sweden 3
Switzerland 4
Canada 5
Singapore 6
United Kingdom 7
Germany 8
Netherlands 9
France 10
Austria 11
Belgium 12
Taiwan 13
Spain 14
Italy 15
Mexico 16
Malaysia 17
Thailand 18
Hong Kong 19
South Korea 20
China 21
Table 1: Revealed Comparative Advantage in the
more Complex Industries
xed e¤ect which aims to capture the variation in policy barriers and
preferences across importing countries d and industries i; and "icd is an
error term which is assumed to be independent across countries c and d
and industries i.
According to Equation (15), the pattern of comparative advantage is
entirely determined by the exporter xed e¤ect, c. To see this, consider
2 exporters, c1 and c2, such that c1 > c2; and 2 industries, i1 and i2,
such that zi1 > zi2. Taking the di¤erences-in-di¤erences in Equation
(15) we get
E

ln
 
xi1c1d=x
i2
c1d
  ln  xi1c2d=xi2c2d =  c1   c2   zi1   zi2 > 0.
In other words, the country with a higher c tends to export relatively
more (towards any importing country) in the more complex industries.
The ranking of the OLS estimates of c is reported in Table 1, from
the highest to the lowest value. According to this ranking, Japan has
a comparative advantage in the more complex industries relative to any
other country in the sample. Conversely, China has a comparative dis-
advantage in the more complex industries relative to all other countries.
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Figure 3: Comparative Advantage and Human Capital per Worker
6.3 Which Countries Have Good Institutions?
We now investigate how much of the previous cross-country variation
can be explained by di¤erences in human capital alone. Formally, we
consider the following linear regression
bc = + hc + "c,
where bc is the OLS estimate of c; and "c is an error term which is
assumed to be independent across countries.
Our results are presented in Figure 3. In line with our theory, we
nd that countries with higher levels of human capital tend to export
relatively more in the more complex industries. The OLS estimate of 
is positive and statistically signicant. A substantial amount of cross-
country variation, however, remains unexplained: the R2 of the previous
regression is equal to 0:40.
We use this unexplained component of the pattern of comparative
advantage as a measuring tool for the quality of institutions. Formally,
we compute our revealed measure of institutional quality asbc  bc   bhc,
where b = 0:22 is the OLS estimate of . If a country exports more in the
more complex industries than its level of human capital predicts, we infer
that in accordance with our main qualitative insight it has good in-
stitutions. Graphically, countries with good institutions are those above
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Country Ranking
Singapore 1
Japan 2
Sweden 3
Switzerland 4
France 5
Austria 6
Mexico 7
Spain 8
United Kingdom 9
Germany 10
Canada 11
United States 12
Taiwan 13
Netherlands 14
Italy 15
Malaysia 16
Thailand 17
Belgium 18
China 19
Hong Kong 20
South Korea 21
Table 2: Revealed Institutional Quality
the regression line in Figure 3. The further away from the regression
line, the better the institutions.
Table 2 presents the ranking of bc, from the highest to the lowest
value. According to our estimates, the top-3 countries in terms of insti-
tutional quality are Singapore, Japan, and Sweden, whereas the bottom-
3 are China, Hong-Kong, and South Korea. The United States is in the
middle of the pack. Although the United States has a strong compara-
tive advantage in the more complex industries, they also have very high
levels of human capital.
6.4 Existing Proxies of Institutional Quality
We conclude this section by investigating how our revealed measure of
institutional quality compares to two existing proxies. The rst one,
Rule of Law, has been developed by Kaufmann et al. (2005) and used
by Levchenko (2004) and Nunn (2005). This proxy includes several
indicators which measure the extent to which agents have condence in
and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the inci-
dence of crime, the e¤ectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and
the enforceability of contracts. The second one, Ability to Perform,
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Figure 4: Revealed Institutional Quality versus Rule of Law
is based on the quality of the workforce index developed by Business En-
vironment Risk Intelligence (B.E.R.I) S.A.. It measures the attributes
of the workforce that contribute to its ability to perform including:
work ethic; availability and quality of trained manpower; class, ethnic
and religious factors; attention span and health; and absenteeism.20
Figures 4 and 5 plot our revealed measure of institutional quality,bc, against Rule of Lawand Ability to Perform, respectively. We
nd comfort in the fact that higher estimates of institutional quality
derived from our theory tend to be associated with higher values of both
proxies. The correlation between bc and Rule of Lawis equal to 0:49,
whereas the correlation between bc and Ability to Performis equal to
0:41. Perhaps not so surprisingly, the discrepancy between our revealed
measure of institutional quality and the two previous proxies appears to
be large for two entrepôt economies, Hong-Kong and Singapore. Since
their patterns of exports are unlikely to reect their relative productivity,
they also are unlikely to reveal the quality of their institutions.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper proposes a simple theory of international trade with endoge-
nous productivity di¤erences across countries. The core of our analysis
lies in the extent of the division of labor or team size. According to our
20See http://www.beri.com/qwiExplanation.asp for details. Ability to perform
corresponds to B.E.R.I.s subindex Workforce Characteristicsin 1995.
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Figure 5: Revealed Institutional Quality versus Ability to Perform
model, team size increases with institutional quality and complexity, but
decreases with human capital per worker. Under free trade, the country
where teams are larger in e¢ ciency units of labor specializes in the
more complex goods. In our set-up, it is the country where the product
of institutional quality and workershuman capital is larger. Hence, bet-
ter institutions and higher levels of education are complementary sources
of comparative advantage in the more complex industries. The previous
section illustrates how these two insights can be used to identify in the
data which countries have good institutions.
At a theoretical level, we have chosen to highlight the costs and ben-
ets of the division of labor, while using a reduced-form approach to
describe institutional quality. In our model, the latter is an exogenous
parameter, whose value may not vary across industries. Though use-
ful for tractability purposes, this assumption may appear unreasonably
strong. For example, employers may well take the quality of their ju-
dicial system as given in practice, but try to improve the performance
of their workers by o¤ering e¢ ciency wages. We strongly conjecture,
however, that our insights regarding the pattern of trade would sur-
vive in an environment where institutional quality is chosen optimally
across industries. The intuition lies in the proof of Proposition 2 and
its use of the envelope theorem. As long as  is chosen optimally in
each industry, changes in z would also a¤ect , but this would only be
a second-order e¤ect and the pattern of comparative advantage would
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remain unchanged.21
Another limitation of our model is that workers in a given country
are assumed to be identical. Although this is admittedly not the most
realistic assumption, it has one important benet. It allows us to ab-
stract from the sorting of heterogeneous workers across industries, and
in turn, to keep the Ricardian nature of our model intact. In a more gen-
eral version of the model, we conjecture that workers with larger endow-
ments would sort into more complex industries, which means that as in
Grossman and Maggi (2000), Grossman (2004), and Ohnsorge and Tre-
er (2004) other moments of the distribution of human capital would
a¤ect the pattern of trade. We view the development of a model incorpo-
rating technological di¤erences and worker heterogeneity as an ambitious
avenue for future research.
21Of course, this requires that the division of labor remains less extensive in coun-
tries with worse institutions, however dened in this new environment.
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A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider a solution (J; C) of (P ) with N jobs.
Claim (i). We need to show that for any worker n hired by a rm, there
exists a unique k = 1; :::; N such that C (n; u) 2 fJk ; ;g for all u 2 R+.
We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that C assigns 0 < Lm  L to
multiple jobs. Since the total number of jobs N is nite and there is a
continuum of workers, there must be 0 < L0  Lm workers who perform
the same set of jobs, J 0. Let us denote Lkm the total amount of labor
that these workers allocate to performing a given job Jkm 2 J 0 under C.
Adding the workersresource constraints, we get
Lkm  km (hc   z0)L0, (16)
where km is the average share of after-training labor that these workers
allocate to Jkm; and z
0 is the total number of tasks in J 0. By assumption,
J 0 includes M > 1 jobs. So, z0 > zkm, the number of tasks in J

km
.
Now consider a contract eC that reallocates the previous L0 workers
across jobs according to the following rule. For any Jkm 2 J 0, it assigns
a mass kmL
0   " workers exclusively to Jkm. The remaining M" > 0
workers are not hired by the rm. It is easy to check that each group of
specialists can allocate eLkm units of labor to Jkm, where eLkm is given byeLkm = kmL0 (hc   zk)  " (hc   zk) (17)
For " small enough, Inequality (16), Equation (17), and z0 > zk implyeLkm > Lkm. So, any potential unit that can be produced under C
can also be produced under eC. This means that expected output is no
smaller under eC, but that the total wage bill is smaller by wcM" > 0.
A contradiction with C being a solution of (P ). QED.
Claim (ii). We need to show that for all k = 1; :::; N , Jk 2 J is
such that
Z
t2Jk
dt = z
i
N
. To do so, we consider 2 distinct jobs Jk1 and
Jk2 2 J. We denote z1 and z2 the number of tasks associated with Jk1
and Jk2, respectively, and L1 and L2 the number of workers assigned
to these 2 jobs. By Claim (i), we know that all workers specialize in 1
job. So, the total amount of labor available for performing each job is
L1 (hc   z1) and L2 (hc   z2). Note that if the rm maximizes its prots,
then all jobs must be performed on the same number of potential units,
Q. (Otherwise, the rm could decrease the mass of workers performing
one job, without decreasing expected output.) This implies
L1

hc   z1
z1

= L2

hc   z2
z2

= Q
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Now consider the following minimization program
min
z1, z2, L1, L2
L1 + L2
subject to:
L1 (hc   z1)= z1Q
L2 (hc   z2)= z2Q
z1 + z2= z
where z is the total number of tasks in Jk1 [Jk2. After plugging the rst
2 constraints into the objective function, we get
min
z1, z2
Q 

z1
hc   z1 +
z2
hc   z2

subject to:
z1 + z2 = z
The two necessary rst-order conditions are given by
Qhc
(hc   z1)2
=  (18)
and
Qhc
(hc   z2)2
=  (19)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with z1+z2 = z. Combin-
ing Equations (18) and (19) with the constraint, we get z1 = z2 = z=2.
This implies that, holding Q constant, the mass of workers necessary to
perform the z tasks in Jk1 [ Jk2 is minimized when Jk1 and Jk2 include
the same number of tasks.
To conclude our proof, we note that if prots are maximized, then
holding the number of potential units constant, the number of workers
must be minimized. So, if J is a solution of (P ), then for any pair of
jobs

Jk1 ; J

k2
	  J, Jk1 and Jk2 must include the same number of tasks.
Since the total number of tasks that must be performed in industry i is
zi, we obtain
Z
t2Jk
dt = z
i
N
, for all k = 1; :::; N . QED.
Proof of Proposition 2. By Equation (12), the derivative of A with
respect to zi is given by
dA
dzi
=
dai2
dzi
ai1   ai2 da
i
1
dzi
(ai1)
2
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Since N i1 and N
i
2 maximize expected prots, they minimize a
i
1 and a
i
2,
respectively. Therefore, the envelope theorem implies
dA
dz
=
@ai2
@zi
ai1   ai2 @a
i
1
@zi
(ai1)
2
Using Equation (9) and simple algebra, we then get
dA
dz
= (h1N
i
1   h2N i2)
with
 =
h2N
i
2e
Ni2
2
 N
i
1
1
h1N i1(h2N
i
2   zi)2
> 0
By Equation (8), h1N i1   h2N i2 > 0 if and only if 1h1 > 2h2. QED.
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B Data
B.1 Complexity
In order to measure complexity, we use the questions of the PSID surveys
of 1985 and 1993: Suppose someone had the experience and education
needed to start working at a job like yours. From that point, how long
would it take them to become fully trained and qualied (to do a job like
yours)?The answer is expressed in number of months ranging from 1
to 97 in 1985, and 1 to 997 in 1993. Our proxy for complexity is equal to
the average number of months necessary to be fully trained and qualied
in a given industry. In the regressions, we normalize it to 1 in the most
complex industry, optical and health services supplies.
Industry Complexity
Knitting mills (225)* 2.38
Miscellaneous fabricated textile products (239)* 2.55
Apparel and accessories (231-238)* 5.20
Yarn, thread, and fabric mills (221-224, 228)* 5.28
Footwear, except rubber (313, 314) 5.52
Logging (241) 7.52
Bakery products (205) 8.21
Rubber products (301-303, 306)* 9.32
Canning and preserving fruits, vegetables, and seafoods (203) 9.51
Meat products (201) 9.75
Furniture and fixtures (25)* 10.94
Sawmills, planing mills, and mill work (242, 243) 12.19
Miscellaneous paper and pulp products (264) 12.36
Miscellaneous food preparation and kindred products (206, 209) 12.43
Miscellaneous plastic products (307) 13.50
Cement, concrete, gypsum, and plaster products (324,327) 13.56
Paperboard containers and boxes (265) 13.60
Motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment (371)* 14.01
Miscellaneous fabricated metal products (341, 343, 347, 348, 349)* 14.70
Electrical machinery, equipment, and supplies, not elsewhere classified (361,
362, 364, 367, 369)* 15.84
Household appliances (363)* 16.00
Fabricated structural metal products (344)* 16.90
Glass and glass products (321-323)* 17.36
Miscellaneous wood products (244, 249) 17.70
Pulp, paper, and paperboard mills (261-263, 266) 17.86
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries (39)* 19.96
Newspaper publishing and printing (271) 20.35
Radio, T.V., and communication equipment (365, 366) 21.04
Machinery, except electrical, not elsewhere classified (355, 356, 358, 359)* 21.43
Blast furnaces, steel works, rolling and finishing mills (3312, 3313) 21.87
Beverage industries (208) 22.00
Printing, publishing, and allied industries, except newspapers (272-279) 22.28
Ship and boat building and repairing (373)* 24.61
Metalworking machinery (354)* 26.66
Industrial chemicals (281) 26.92
Electronic computing equipment (3573)* 29.37
Construction and material handling machines (353)* 29.88
Drugs and medicines (283) 31.00
Aircraft and parts (372)* 31.84
Optical and health services supplies (383, 384, 385)* 35.19
Table B1: Ranking of Industries by Complexity
30
Together, these surveys provide us with a total of 3341 observations,
covering 82 manufacturing industries. The industry classication is de-
veloped within the 3-digit Standard Industrial Classication (SIC) from
1972; the SIC codes are indicated in parentheses. Table A1 reports the
ranking of the 40 industries for which we have more than 25 observations.
B.2 Exporter characteristics
In order to facilitate comparisons, all country characteristics are ex-
pressed as ratios to US values.
Country
Human Capital
per Worker Rule of Law
Ability to
Perform
Austria 0.67 1.11 1.12
Belgium 0.84 0.92 1.16
Canada 0.91 1.04 0.97
China 0.63 -0.25 0.60
France 0.67 0.92 1.12
Germany 0.80 1.06 1.21
Hong-Kong 0.74 0.96 1.28
Italy 0.65 0.50 1.03
Japan 0.80 0.89 1.45
Malaysia 0.59 0.47 0.78
Mexico 0.54 -0.07 0.84
Netherlands 0.80 1.08 1.28
Singapore 0.55 1.19 1.42
South Korea 0.76 0.45 1.19
Spain 0.61 0.69 0.92
Sweden 0.85 1.13 1.30
Switzerland 0.83 1.21 1.35
Taiwan 0.70 0.57 1.33
Thailand 0.58 0.27 0.49
United Kingdom 0.81 1.08 1.00
United States 1.00 1.00 1.00
Table B2: List of Exporters
B.3 Trade data
As mentioned in the main text, trade data are from the 1992 World
Trade Flows Database; see Feenstra et al. (2005). The data are orga-
nized by the 4-digit Standard International Trade Classication (SITC),
revision 2. In order to compute the bilateral exports for every sector
present in Table B1, we proceed as follows. First, we compute the set
of 4-digit SIC 1972 codes associated with each sector, and then convert
these codes into the 4-digit SITC, revision 2. We drop all SITC sec-
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tors associated with more than one index of complexity. The bilateral
exports in a given sector are equal to the sum of the exports over the
remaining SITC sectors. We obtain a sample of 20 industries, denoted
with asterisks in Table B1, which together account for 57% of world
exports in manufacturing in 1992.
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